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Opponents see it as a "slow-growth" plan
at best and, at worst, as a "no-growth"
plan.
Under the zoning regulations, overall
residential density in western Loudoun County would
be drastically reduced. Instead of one house per three
acres, development would be limited to one house per
10, 20 or even 50 acres. The law provides density
incentives for clustering homes to preserve open space
and protect sensitive natural resources -- wetlands,
streams, flood plains, mature forests, wildlife habitats,
and aesthetically or historically valuable rural landscapes.
Plaintiffs claim that the law is a form
of geographically discriminatory down-zoning that
reduces property values, unfairly revokes vested development
rights and represents unconstitutional taking of property.
By restricting the future supply of
subdivision lots and homes, opponents further argue,
the new zoning will result in rising housing costs.
They assert that the law amounts to exclusionary zoning
intended to safeguard the economic and social interests
of "elitist" landowners in western Loudoun
County.
The county has been wrestling with
the sticky politics and rising costs of rapid population
increase for more than two decades. Previous county
growth-management plans and zoning changes have been
chronically frustrated as attitudes shift and voters
elect either pro-growth or anti-growth supervisors.
It's possible to sympathize with those
on both sides of the argument.
On the one hand, many voters recognize
the compelling need to wisely manage growth to protect
the environment for future generations. Most citizens
voice support for reducing air and water pollution,
relieving traffic congestion, providing and maintaining
quality public services, and combating unsightly sprawl.
For some, smart growth is a moral issue.
On the other hand, put yourself in the place of an
owner of property whose value has been instantly shrunk
by half, two-thirds or even more. Imagine awakening
one morning to learn that you are among those whose
assets are substantially diminished by a new law.
Is this fair? Can these conflicting
but legitimate interests be reconciled?
If they cannot, smart growth in the
future is likely to be little more than a catch phrase.
Litigation will persist as landowners, builders and
developers ask courts and legislatures to uphold private-property
rights, even though private-property rights and values
are created by public policies and public investments.
Reconciling these conflicting interests
requires achieving two objectives at once: implementing
smart-growth plans and legislation to better use and
protect natural resources for the benefit of society
as a whole, and fairly compensating those property
owners who lose vested development rights and suffer
unreasonable financial loss because of government
acts aimed at achieving the first objective.
There are basically two means for accomplishing
this. Both are difficult politically and economically.
One entails direct or indirect use
of eminent domain, whereby government pays property
owners for lost rights, or buys property outright,
using public tax money. This can be costly and is
always contentious because it requires establishing
fair market value for rights or for land based on
a hypothetical assessment of future development potential.
The other entails transferring development
rights from down-zoned areas to areas where greater
density is desired, planned for, and supported by
appropriate infrastructure and public services. This,
too, requires establishing hypothetical fair market
values for transferable rights.
Owners or developers of properties
receiving additional development rights would purchase
them at a cost based primarily on the location of
"receiving" properties, not "sending"
properties. In this scenario, a government agency
or other fiduciary entity can act as a development-rights
bank to financially bridge the time gap between purchasing
and selling rights. This would be profitable for the
public because the cost of acquiring development rights
from a lower-density sending area typically would
be less than the value realized upon subsequent sale
and transfer to a higher-density receiving area.
To be fair and effective, a system for transferable
development rights, commonly called TDR, must be regional
in scale, adequately funded during start-up years,
properly managed, and, above all, supported by detailed
master plans that adequately justify and precisely
designate sending and receiving areas.
For these reasons, relatively few jurisdictions
in the United States have embraced TDR as a smart-growth
planning and implementation strategy. And TDR remains
a foreign concept in Virginia. Unfortunately, given
the state's political culture and the legislature's
constitutional dominance over local authorities, creating
a workable TDR strategy in Northern Virginia would
be an uphill battle, one that would have to be waged
mostly in Richmond.
Yet it is a battle that must be fought
if urbanizing counties really believe in smart growth.
For the moment, only courthouse battles will be waged,
defending against countless lawsuits like those just
filed in Loudoun County. And even if Loudoun planning
officials and lawyers have fashioned a zoning law
capable of withstanding the litigation attack, the
real struggle over coping with growth will have only
just begun.
Roger K. Lewis is a practicinhg
architect and a professor of architecture at the University
of Maryland.
© 2003 The Washington Post Company
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